Intimidating competitors - Endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment in successive oligopoly by Buehler, Stefan & Schmutzler, Armin
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Year: 2007
Intimidating competitors - Endogenous vertical integration and
downstream investment in successive oligopoly
Buehler, S; Schmutzler, A
Buehler, S; Schmutzler, A. Intimidating competitors - Endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment
in successive oligopoly. International Journal of Industrial Organization 2007, article in press.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Originally published at:
International Journal of Industrial Organization 2007, article in press
Buehler, S; Schmutzler, A. Intimidating competitors - Endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment
in successive oligopoly. International Journal of Industrial Organization 2007, article in press.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Originally published at:
International Journal of Industrial Organization 2007, article in press
Intimidating competitors - Endogenous vertical integration and
downstream investment in successive oligopoly
Abstract
This paper examines the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and cost-reducing downstream
investment in successive oligopoly. Analyzing a linear Cournot model, we establish the following key
results: (i) Vertical integration increases own investment and decreases competitor investment
(intimidation effect). (ii) Asymmetric integration is a non-degenerate equilibrium outcome. (iii)
Compared to a benchmark model without investment, complete vertical separation is a less likely
outcome. We argue that these findings generalize beyond the linear Cournot model under reasonable
assumptions.
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1 Introduction
Understanding strategic behavior in successive oligopoly is an important ob-
jective of industrial organization. A substantial literature has highlighted the
links between vertical market structure and pricing in successive oligopoly.1
The relation between vertical market structure and cost-reducing investments
has received comparatively little attention.2 In the present paper, we argue
that the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and investment decisions
is crucial for our understanding of strategic behavior in successive oligopoly.
In particular, we show that a firm’s vertical integration generates what we call
an “intimidation” eﬀect, that is, vertical integration decreases cost-reducing
investment by competitors. There is thus a strategic motive for vertical in-
tegration that has gone unnoticed in the previous literature. Incorporating
endogenous investment decisions into successive oligopoly models also allows
us to shed new light on the analysis of equilibrium industry structure and
the relation between industry structure and performance, two key issues of
the literature on endogenous vertical integration in successive oligopoly.
Our analysis first shows how vertical market structure aﬀects the cost-
reducing investments of individual firms. We then use the insights from
this analysis to show how vertical structure and cost-reducing investments
are determined as jointly endogenous by more primitive variables, such as
market size and investment costs. To this end, we consider a simple linear
Cournot model in the tradition of Salinger (1988), which we modify to include
both endogenous integration and investment decisions.
In this model, two downstream firms face two vertically-separated up-
stream suppliers. To produce one unit of the final product, downstream
firms require one unit of an intermediate good produced by upstream firms.
Downstream marginal costs consist of the costs of obtaining the intermedi-
ate good plus the costs of transforming the intermediate good into the final
product. The timing of the game is as follows. In stage 1, downstream firms
1Contributions to this literature include Ordover et al. (1990), Hart and Tirole (1990),
Gaudet and Long (1996), Abiru et al. (1998), Chen (2001), Elberfeld (2001, 2002), Jansen
(2003), Linnemer (2003), Dufeu (2004), and Buehler and Schmutzler (2005).
2Notable exeptions include Banerjee and Lin (2003) and Brocas (2003).
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decide whether to integrate backwards by acquiring a supplier at fixed cost,
thereby getting access to the intermediate good at marginal cost.3 Three con-
ceivable vertical structures can emerge from this stage. Under integration,
there are two integrated supply chains, whereas under separation, there are
two separated downstream firms buying the input from two upstream firms.
Finally, there is the intermediate case of asymmetric integration with an in-
tegrated and a separated downstream firm. In stage 2, downstream firms can
invest into reducing the costs of transforming the intermediate good into the
final product, thereby increasing their transformation eﬃciency. In stage 3,
the wholesale price at which the input good is sold to downstream firms is
determined. In stage 4, product market competition takes place.
We first examine the relation between vertical market structure and cost-
reducing investment, holding vertical market structure fixed. Our main re-
sults for this setting are the following. First, under asymmetric integration
the integrated firm invests more into cost reduction than the separated com-
petitor. Second, comparing two structures which diﬀer only with respect to
one firm’s integration decision, we find that a firm’s integration leads this
firm to invest more and the competitor to invest less. The latter eﬀect on
the competitor–the intimidation eﬀect of vertical integration–implies that
there is a strategic incentive to integrate vertically. That is, vertical integra-
tion serves as a top dog strategy (Fudenberg and Tirole 1984) geared towards
tapering the competitor’s cost-reducing investments. Importantly, this eﬀect
does not rely on the existence of strategic substitutes in the product market,
even though we work in a Cournot framework.
Next, we analyze the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the whole
game, allowing both vertical market structure and cost-reducing investments
to be determined endogenously. Here, we obtain the following key results.
First, in spite of the initial symmetry, asymmetric integration is a non-
degenerate equilibrium outcome of the game. This reflects the strategic-
substitutes property of vertical integration decisions: The strategic integra-
tion incentive is likely to be larger for a firm facing a separated competitor
3The assumption of fixed integration costs is a simplification that we shall discuss in
some more detail below.
2
than for a firm facing an integrated competitor.4 As a result, asymmetric
equilibria typically involve integrated firms investing more into eﬃciency than
their separated counterparts. Put diﬀerently, our analysis suggests that, in
asymmetric equilibria, we are likely to observe large integrated and small sep-
arated firms. This finding is in line with the market structure of a number
of vertically-related industries documented in the literature, including the
oil industry (Bindemann 1999), the beer industry in the UK (Slade 1998a),
and the US cable television industry (Chipty 2001).5 Second, compared to
a benchmark model without investment, separation is a less likely outcome.
This result relates to the intimidation eﬀect of vertical integration: With
endogenous investment, unilateral deviation from separation is more attrac-
tive than without investment, because vertical integration has the additional
benefit of intimidating the competitor.
The driving force behind our results is the eﬃciency eﬀect of integration:
Vertical integration reduces the integrating firm’s marginal cost, so that the
integrating firm becomes a stronger competitor. As a result, the equilibrium
outputs and mark-ups of a firm are non-decreasing in its own integration
status and non-increasing in the competitor’s integration status. As we elab-
orate in the working paper version of this article, our key results generalize
beyond the linear Cournot model whenever this property holds.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only three papers that have
focused on the relation of vertical market structure and cost-reducing invest-
ment in oligopoly. Holding vertical market structure fixed, Banerjee and Lin
(2003) show that downstream oligopolists may invest more into cost-reducing
R&D than a downstream monopolist. Intuitively, the result follows from the
output-enhancing eﬀect of R&D, which allows the upstream firm to increase
its input price, raising rival’s costs. Brocas (2003) studies a setting where
downstream firms face costs for switching technologies licensed by innovating
upstream firms. The prices of licences vary with the size of switching costs:
4We analyze the strategic-substitutes property of vertical integration decisions in more
detail in Buehler and Schmutzler (2005).
5Further examples include, for instance, the gasoline retail market in Vancouver (Slade
1998b), the Mexican footwear industry (Woodruﬀ 2002) and the UK package holiday
industry (European Commission 1999).
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Easily substitutable technologies are licensed at low prices, whereas inno-
vative technologies with high switching costs command high prices. This
aﬀects investment incentives, and eﬃcient technologies with low switching
costs may disappear. In this setting, both upstream and downstream firms
may find it profitable to integrate vertically. Finally, Inderst and Wey (2005)
study the implications of downstream mergers for an upstream supplier’s in-
vestment in cost reduction. These authors argue that large or strong buyers
spur upstream innovation.
In a broader sense, our paper also relates to the strategic trade literature.
Even though this literature does not deal directly with vertical-integration
decisions, it exploits the strategic-substitutes property of cost-reducing in-
vestments that is crucial for the existence of the intimidation eﬀect. Contrary
to our analysis, however, the strategic trade literature uses these properties to
argue that governments can use strategic policy to influence R&D-decisions
of firms in other countries in a manner that is favorable to home country
firms (Bagwell and Staiger 1994).
Finally, while our analysis primarily seeks to improve our understanding
of the relation between vertical structure and investment in a static setting,
it may also be relevant to the understanding of market dynamics. A large
literature uses dynamic investment models suggesting howmarket dominance
may emerge in a setting with small initial diﬀerences between a leader and
a laggard.6 Specific emphasis is placed on the idea that leaders with low
costs (and thus high demand) often have stronger incentives to reduce their
costs even further because this is more worthwhile, given their high demand.
Even though the present paper treats only one period of the investment
game explicitly, it suggests a mechanism by which integration can create the
asymmetry between a leader and a laggard: Without vertical integration,
our firms would always choose identical investment levels and thus remain
symmetric. The binary nature of the integration decision changes this, as it
makes asymmetric industry structures possible, which are then reinforced by
cost-reducing investments.
6This has been discussed for incremental investment games (Flaherty 1980), learning-
by-doing models (Cabral and Riordan 1994) or switching cost models (Beggs and Klem-
perer 1992); Athey and Schmutzler (2001) provide an integrated approach.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
introduce the model. Section 3 provides a number of auxiliary results on the
properties of outputs, mark-ups and profits in the linear Cournot setting.
Section 4 considers investment decisions for given vertical structures. Section
5 studies the subgame-perfect equilibrium market structure. In Section 6,
we discuss the interplay of endogenous investment and integration decisions
and sketch how our analysis generalizes beyond the linear Cournot setting.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
We carry out our analysis in a modified version of the linear Cournot model
proposed by Salinger (1988). Our model diﬀers from Salinger in two key as-
pects: (i) Vertical market structure is endogenously determined. (ii) Down-
stream firms make cost-reducing investments.
We present our analysis so that it becomes clear that the driving forces
behind our results are not specific to the linear Cournot model.
2.1 Overview
Initially, there are two independent upstream firms, and two independent
downstream firms. To produce one unit of the final product, a downstream
firm requires one unit of the intermediate good provided by an upstream
firm. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the game.
<Figure 1 about here>
In stage 1, downstream firms simultaneously decide whether to integrate
backwards by acquiring one of the upstream firms at fixed cost F > 0. The
decision of firm i = 1, 2 is represented by the variable Vi such that Vi = 1
if it integrates and Vi = 0 if it remains separated. In stage 2, downstream
firms simultaneously carry out cost-reducing investments Yi at cost K(Yi) =
kY 2i , k > 0, thereby determining the eﬃciency at which the intermediate good
is transformed into the final product. In stage 3, any remaining separated
upstream firms set wholesale quantities for the upstream market, resulting
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in costs wi ≥ 0 for obtaining the input good. In stage 4, downstream firms
compete à la Cournot in a product market with linear demand, choosing
their outputs qi, i = 1, 2, with marginal costs determined by the preceding
stages of the game.
2.2 Specification
We now describe the specification of our model. Since we will look for the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, we begin with the last stage of the game.
Stage 4
In the product market, firms face a linear inverse demand curve P (Q) = a−Q,
with Q = q1+q2 and a > 0. As indicated above, the firms’ activities in stages
1, 2 and 3 determine Vi, Yi, and wi, thereby aﬀecting the marginal costs ci
of downstream firms in stage 4. Solving the profit maximization problem
for given levels of marginal costs yields the following Cournot outputs qi,
mark-ups mi,7 and profits πi, respectively8
qi(ci, cj) = mi(ci, cj) = (a− 2ci + cj) /3, (1)
πi(ci, cj) = (a− 2ci + cj)2 /9, (2)
with i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
Stage 3
In stage 3, the cost of obtaining the input wi, i = 1, 2, is determined as the
marginal cost of producing the input for an integrated firm or the equilib-
rium upstream price faced by a separated downstream firm. For simplicity,
we assume that the marginal cost of producing the input is constant and
normalized to zero.
7Here and in the following, we refer to absolute mark-ups, that is, the diﬀerence between
equilibrium prices and marginal costs.
8We are implicitly assuming that an interior solution arises in the Cournot game. It
can be shown that this must happen on the equilibrium path if k is suﬃciently large for
second-order conditions to hold.
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(i) Under integration, we therefore obtain that input costs are given by
wi = 0, i = 1, 2, by assumption. This reflects the intuition that inte-
grated firms obtain the input at marginal cost, avoiding double mar-
ginalization.9
(ii) Under asymmetric integration, Salinger’s (1988) solution concept im-
plies that the integrated firm is inactive in the upstream market (i.e.,
it does neither sell nor buy in the upstream market).10 Consequently,
the separated downstream firm must buy the input from the remain-
ing separated upstream firm at the monopoly price. For the integrated
firm, in turn, we have wi = 0, as the marginal cost of producing the
input is normalized to zero.
(iii) Our treatment of separation also follows Salinger (1988): If upstream
competition results in a wholesale price w, downstream firms play
Cournot competition, resulting in a total quantity Q(w), which trans-
lates one-to-one into a corresponding input requirement.
Stage 2
In stage 2, firms decide about their cost-reducing investments. Both firms
initially have identical transformation costs t > 0. Denoting firm i’s eﬃciency
improvement by Yi, ex post transformation costs are given by ti = t − Yi.
Firm i’s marginal costs are thus given by
ci = wi + ti = wi + t− Yi, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Stage 1
In stage 1, downstream firms take vertical integration decisions. For sim-
plicity, we suppose that downstream firms can acquire an upstream firm at
9As there are no explicit choices of wholesale prices when both firms are integrated and
wi = 0 by assumption, the four-stage game reduces to a three-stage game.
10We critically discuss Salinger’s solution concept in Section 2.3 and show in Appendix
2 that the integrated firm’s inactivity in the upstream market is not important for our
results.
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fixed cost F > 0.11 It is important to note that integration decisions aﬀect
firm i’s profits through three channels. First, as already discussed, there is
the direct eﬃciency eﬀect that own integration reduces marginal costs. Sec-
ond, at least if firm i is separated, the integration decision of firm j 6= i
has an eﬀect on wi. Third, integration can potentially aﬀect investment
decisions. Thus, firm i’s product market profits are given by the function
Πi (Vi, Vj;Yi (Vi, Vj) , Yj (Vi, Vj)). To simplify exposition, we henceforth sup-
press the arguments Vi and Vj and write product market profits as Πi (Yi, Yj),
wherever there is no danger of confusion. Where necessary, we use the su-
perscript v ∈ {I, S,AI,AS} to indicate firm i’s vertical structure and the
relevant market configuration. That is, v = I and v = S indicate integra-
tion and separation, respectively, whereas v = AI and v = AS indicate that
the firm under consideration is integrated or separated, respectively, under
asymmetric integration.
Downstream firms thus choose Vi ∈ {0, 1} so as to maximize
Πi (Yi, Yj)− kY 2i − ViF, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
where (Yi, Yj) is understood to correspond to the subgame-perfect equilibrium
choices of investment in the relevant market configuration.
2.3 Product Market Equilibrium
We now characterize the product market equilibrium in the various market
configurations. Table 1 in Appendix 1 provides a summary of the results.
11Ideally, acquisition costs would be endogenous, reflecting both the opportunity costs
of the upstream firm being taken over and transaction costs. That is, in a more complex
model, acquisition costs would be a function of the firms eﬃciency levels and the industry’s
vertical structure. See Buehler and Schmutzler (2005) for a reduced-form analysis of the
role of endogenous acquisition costs in successive oligopoly.
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2.3.1 Integration
Under integration, firms are Cournot competitors with costs ci = t−Yi. The
equilibrium profits of firm i are therefore given by
ΠIi (Yi, Yj) =
(α+ 2Yi − Yj)2
9
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, (3)
where the superscript I indicates the integration case, and α ≡ a− t is our
measure of market size.
2.3.2 Asymmetric Integration
Under asymmetric integration, we face the problem that an integrated firm
needs to make some conjecture about the eﬀect of its activity in the upstream
market on both the upstream and the downstream market. The simplest way
of dealing with this problem is to adopt Salinger’s (1988) solution concept
for successive oligopoly models, which imposes that an integrated firm con-
jectures “Cournot reactions to input sales” and “Bertrand reactions to input
purchases” (Schrader and Martin 1998).12 These conjectures imply that an
integrated firm will withdraw from the upstream market: An integrated firm
will not want to sell to the input market,13 as the retail price is higher than
the input price. Also, an integrated firm will not want to buy from the input
market, as the cost of producing the input is lower.
In the main text, we use Salinger’s solution concept. As a result, if firm
1 is integrated, we obtain the wholesale price
w (Y1, Y2) =
α− Y1 + 2Y2
4
.
12More specifically, Salinger’s solution concept imposes the following assumptions: If
an integrated firms sells an extra unit of the intermediate good, it conjectures that other
intermedate good producers maintain their outputs. If an integrated firm buys an extra
unit of the intermediate good, it conjectures that another intermediate good producer
expands its output by one unit and other final good producers maintain their outputs.
13Ordover et al. (1990) make a similar assumption. Hart and Tirole (1990) and Reiﬀen
(1992) criticize this assumption, based on the argument that it amounts to requiring that
the integrated firm can commit to refrain from (profitable) undercutting in the upstream
market.
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Profits of the integrated and separated firm turn out to be
ΠAIi (Yi, Yj) =
(5α+ 7Yi − 2Yj)2
144
, (4)
ΠASi (Yi, Yj) =
(2α− 2Yj + 4Yi)2
144
. (5)
In Appendix 2, we solve the model using an alternative solution concept
proposed by Schrader and Martin (1998), which imposes that an integrated
firm conjectures Cournot reactions to both input sales and purchases. We
show that, with this alternative solution concept, the integrated firm does
not withdraw from the input market. Instead, the integrated firm chooses
to buy from the input market, even though this involves higher input costs,
because making purchases in the input market increases the downstream
rival’s costs. Yet, as we show in Appendix 2, our key results are not aﬀected
by the integrated firm’s activity in the upstream market.
2.3.3 Separation
Under separation, both upstream and downstream firms are Cournot com-
petitors. Aggregating downstream Cournot outputs and rearranging yields
the inverse upstream demand
w(Q) =
2α+ Yi + Yj − 3Q
2
. (6)
Using (6), upstream competitors choose their profit-maximizing outputs,
thereby determining the upstream price
w (Yi, Yj) =
2α+ Yi + Yj
6
.
Profits of downstream firms turn out to be
ΠSi (Yi, Yj) =
(4α+ 11Yi − 7Yj)2
324
, (7)
where the superscript S indicates the separation case.
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3 Auxiliary Results
We now summarize a number of important properties of the linear Cournot
model.
Lemma 1 (output and mark-up) (i) The outputs qi (ci, cj) , mark-ups
mi (ci, cj) , and profits πi(ci, cj) are non-increasing in own costs ci and
non-decreasing in competitor costs cj.
(ii) The outputs Qi(Yi, Yj) and mark-ups Mi(Yi, Yj) and are non-decreasing
in own eﬃciency Yi and non-increasing in competitor eﬃciency Yj.
(iii) The output and mark-up of an integrated firm facing a separated com-
petitor are larger than the output and mark-up of a separated firm facing
an integrated competitor, i.e.,
QAIi (Yi, Yj) > Q
AS
i (Yi, Yj) and M
AI
i (Yi, Yj) > M
AS
i (Yi, Yj).
Proof. (i) follows immediately from (1) and (2); (ii) follows from inspec-
tion of Qvi , v = I, S,AI,AS, in Table 1; (iii) follows from the comparison of
QAIi (Yi, Yj) = (5α + 7Yi − 2Yj)/12 and QASi (Yi, Yj) = (2α − 2Yj + 4Yi)/12
from Table 1.
Result (i) is a standard property of the linear Cournot model.
Result (ii) is closely related to result (i): An increase in own eﬃciency Yi
directly reduces own costs ci = wi+t−Yi, which works towards higher output
and mark-up. However, for a separated firm, this direct eﬀect is moderated
by changes in the wholesale price: A separated firm i that becomes more
eﬃcient increases its input demand and thus drives up the wholesale price
(Banerjee and Lin 2003), so that the cost reduction does not exactly match
the increase in transformation eﬃciency. Similarly, the negative eﬀect of
higher Yj on Mi and Qi reflects the competitor’s higher eﬃciency and the
induced changes of the wholesale price.
Result (iii) reflects the eﬃciency eﬀect of vertical integration. To under-
stand the condition QAIi (Yi, Yj) > QASi (Yi, Yj), first note that QIi (Yi, Yj) >
QASi (Yi, Yj): Firm i’s move from separation to integration reduces its own
costs due to the elimination of the upstream mark-up, leaving the costs of
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the other firm unaﬀected; hence, firm i’s output increases (and similarly, the
mark-up). Next, note that QAIi (Yi, Yj) > QIi (Yi, Yj): The separation of firm
i’s competitor increases the competitor’s costs and thus firm i’s output (and
mark-up). Combining these arguments yields the result.
Our next Lemma collects some properties of the profit functions that are
crucial for our main results.
Lemma 2 (investment incentive) Firm i’s marginal investment incen-
tive satisfies the following properties, with i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j:
(i) The investment incentive of an integrated firm facing a separated com-
petitor is higher than that of a separated firm facing an integrated com-
petitor, i.e.,
∂ΠAIi
∂Yi
(Yi, Yj) >
∂ΠASi
∂Yi
(Yi, Yj).
(ii) A firm’s integration has a non-negative eﬀect on its own marginal in-
vestment incentive and a non-positive eﬀect on the competitor’s invest-
ment incentive; hence
∂ΠAIi
∂Yi
(Yi, Yj) ≥
∂ΠIi
∂Yi
(Yi, Yj) ≥
∂ΠSi
∂Yi
(Yi, Yj) ≥
∂ΠASi
∂Yi
(Yi, Yj),
where these inequalities require that firms are not too asymmetric.
(iii) The marginal investment incentive
∂Πi
∂Yi
(Yi, Yj) is non-increasing in Yj.
Proof. (i) From Table 1, we have ΠAIi = (5α+ 7Yi − 2Yj)
2 /144 and
ΠASi = (2α− 2Yj + 4Yi)
2 /144. Diﬀerentiating with respect to Yi and Yj, re-
spectively, yields the result, taking into account that Yj < α+2Yi for positive
equilibrium outputs. (ii) Table 1 gives Πi for each market configuration. Dif-
ferentiating Πi and comparing ∂Πi/∂Yi in the various market configurations
yields the result. (iii) Follows from inspection of ∂Πi/∂Yi in the various
market configurations.
Result (i) is closely related to result (iii) of Lemma 1, which states that
the output and mark-up of an integrated firm facing a separated competi-
tor are larger than the output and mark-up of a separated firm facing an
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integrated competitor. Since higher mark-up means that demand increases
resulting from greater eﬃciency are more valuable, and higher demand means
that mark-up increases are more valuable, the benefits from vertical integra-
tion and cost-reducing investment are mutually reinforcing. Put diﬀerently,
there are demand/mark-up complementarities in product market competi-
tion. There is, however, a potential countervailing eﬀect: The size of the de-
mand and mark-up increases resulting from higher eﬃciency could, at least
in principle, decrease with vertical integration. However, as noted above,
higher downstream eﬃciency increases the input price due to higher input
demand, which, in turn, moderates the output and mark-up increases re-
sulting from higher downstream eﬃciency for a separated firm. This eﬀect
is clearly absent for an integrated firm, at least if it does not buy from the
input market. It is thus unsurprising that (i) holds in the linear Cournot
model.
Result (ii) states that a firm’s investment incentive is non-decreasing in
own integration and non-increasing in competitor integration. Note that
(ii) implies (i), with similar intuition. The reason that we included (i) as a
separate statement is that it often holds outside the linear Cournot model,
whereas (ii) tends to be violated more often. Again, the result is driven by
demand/mark-up complementarities in the product market. Intuitively, as
a firm integrates, the eﬃciency eﬀect results in higher demand and mark-
up. Further increases in demand and mark-up resulting from cost-reducing
investment thus become more worthwhile. By analogous reasoning, the in-
tegration of a competitor reduces a firm’s demand and mark-up, thereby
reducing the benefits of additional demand and mark-up increases. This is
the intimidation eﬀect of integration.
Result (iii) states that investment decisions are strategic substitutes,14
that is, a firm’s investment incentive is lower when the competitor is more
eﬃcient. This also follows from demand/mark-up complementarities. To see
this, note that increases in Yi lead to increases in firm i’s output and mark-
up, whereas increases in Yj lead to decreases of these quantities. The adverse
14For horizontal oligopolies, this property has been noted, for instance, by Bagwell
and Staiger (1994) and Athey and Schmutzler (2001); we also exploit it in Buehler and
Schmutzler (2005).
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eﬀect of competitors’ investments on own output and mark-up reduces the
benefit from the positive eﬀect of own investments on these quantities.15
4 Investment Decisions
In this section, we examine how investment decisions depend on vertical
market structure.
4.1 Fixed Vertical Structure
First, we compare the investments of integrated and separated firms, holding
vertical market structure fixed. More specifically, we consider the case of
asymmetric integration where firm 1 is integrated and firm 2 is separated.
Figure 2a) depicts the optimal investment levels Y AI1 (α, k) and Y AS2 (α, k) as a
function of the cost parameter k > 4/9,16 fixing market size at α = 1. Figure
2b) shows the resulting market shares sAI1 and sAS2 = 1 − sAI1 , respectively.
Clearly, the integrated firm 1 invests more and has a higher market share
than the separated firm 2 (i.e., Y AI1 > Y AS2 and sAI1 > sAS2 ).
<Figure 2 about here>
To put the result into perspective, consider output decisions when firms
are unable to invest into cost reduction (or equivalently, k →∞). Figure 2b)
indicates that even when firms cannot invest into cost reduction, the market
share of the integrated firm is higher than that of the separated firm, that is,
sAI1 (Y1 = 0, Y2 = 0) > 0.5. This reflects the simple fact that the integrated
firm has lower marginal costs than the separated firm due to the elimination
of a mark-up at the upstream level. However, this is not the end of the
story: If firms can invest into cost reduction, the gap between the two firms
widens, since the integrated firm invests more than the separated firm (see
Figure 2b)). We summarize our results for the asymmetric integration case
as follows:
15Again, there are potential countereﬀects of Yi and Yj on the derivatives of output and
mark-up, but they do not upset the result in the linear Cournot model.
16We focus on the case where k > 4/9 to assure concavity of the firms’ profit functions.
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Proposition 1 Under asymmetric integration,
(i) the integrated firm has higher output, mark-up, and market share than
the separated firm, even if eﬃciency levels are exogenous and identical.
(ii) if investment levels are endogenous, the integrated firm invests more
than the separated firm (Y AIi > Y ASj ), and the diﬀerences in outputs,
mark-ups, and market shares increase.
Proof. (i) Follows immediately from result (iii) of Lemma 1. (ii) The
statement on the investment levels follows directly from comparison of the
investments levels in the asymmetric integration case in Table 1. For the
claim on outputs, first note that the diﬀerence between the outputs of the
integrated and separated firm is α/4 when investment is not allowed (and
hence Yi = 0). With investment, the diﬀerence is (α+ Yi) /4, where Yi > 0
is the investment level of the integrated firm. The statements on mark-ups
and market shares are similar.
Part (i) reflects the eﬃciency eﬀect of vertical integration, that is, the
fact that the integrated firm obtains the input at marginal cost (w1 = 0),
whereas the separated firm pays the monopoly price (w2 > w1).
Next, consider the statement in (ii) that, if the firms diﬀer only with
respect to their vertical integration status, the integrated firm will invest
more into cost reduction than the separated firm. Intuitively, the result
follows from result (iii) of Lemma 1, which states that the integrated firm has
higher equilibrium demand and mark-up than its separated competitor. The
demand/mark-up complementarity therefore implies that the integrated firm
has higher incentives to invest than the separated competitor, as reflected in
condition (i) of Lemma 2. In addition, condition (iii) of Lemma 2 implies
that the higher investment of the integrated firm and the lower investment of
the competitor are mutually reinforcing. Thus, integrated firms invest more
than separated firms.17
17Proposition 1 is related to Linnemer (2003) and Buehler and Schmutzler (2005), which
both highlight the eﬃciency eﬀect of vertical integration. Specifically, Proposition 2 in
Buehler and Schmutzler (2005) is essentially the converse of Part (ii) of Proposition 1,
stating that more eﬃcient firms are more likely to integrate.
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4.2 Changing Vertical Structure
So far, we have focused on the investment behavior of integrated and sep-
arated firms, holding vertical market structure fixed. This comparison was
natural to understand the relation between vertical integration and invest-
ment. We now consider how changes in vertical structure aﬀect investment
behavior. More specifically, we examine how a firm’s integration aﬀects the
level of own and competitor investment.
Inspection of Table 1 indicates that starting from separation, firm i’s
integration increases own investment (Y AIi > Y Si ) and decreases firm j’s
investment (Y ASj < Y Sj ). Starting from asymmetric integration, firm j’s in-
tegration has similar eﬀects on investments (i.e., Y Ii < Y AIi , Y Ij > Y ASj ).
The adverse eﬀect on the competitor’s investment is what we call the “in-
timidation eﬀect” of vertical integration. We summarize these findings as
follows:
Proposition 2 (intimidation eﬀect) A firm’s vertical integration increases
its own investment and decreases the competitor’s investment.
Proposition 2 is crucial for our analysis of integration decisions below,
as it points to a strategic benefit of integration that has hitherto gone un-
noticed. To see why the result holds, recall that by part (ii) of Lemma 2,
a firm’s vertical integration increases its own investment incentive, whereas
it decreases the competitor’s investment incentive. By part (iii) in Lemma
2, the positive eﬀect of vertical integration on own investment and the neg-
ative eﬀect on competitor investment are mutually reinforcing. Intuitively,
it should therefore be clear that the intimidation eﬀect does not rely on the
specifics of the linear Cournot model, but on the underlying properties of
this model that are captured by Lemma 2.
5 Equilibrium Market Structure
In this section, we endogenize integration decisions. Our main result charac-
terizes the equilibriummarket structure, using simple reduced-form notation.
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Proposition 3 (equilibrium structure) Let eΠvi = Πvi − k(Y vi )2 denote
firm i’s net profit. Then, in the linear Cournot model with endogenous in-
vestment and integration,
(i) separation occurs if the costs of own integration exceed the benefits for
a firm that faces a separated competitor (eΠAIi − eΠSi ≤ F, i = 1, 2).
(ii) integration occurs if the benefits of own integration exceed the costs
for a separated firm facing an integrated competitor (eΠIi − eΠASi ≥ F, i =
1, 2).
(iii) asymmetric integration occurs if the benefits of integration exceed
the costs for a firm facing a separated competitor, but not for a firm
facing an integrated competitor (eΠAIi − eΠSi ≥ F ≥ eΠIi − eΠASi , i = 1, 2).
The result is an immediate implication of the best-reply conditions. In
Appendix 3, we restate the conditions of this proposition in terms of the
parameters α, k and F of the linear Cournot model. This leads to less trans-
parent expressions, but allows for a simple graphical representation of the
equilibrium market structure. Figure 3 depicts the various types of equilib-
ria as a function of the investment cost parameter k and market size α, fixing
the exogenous integration cost at F = 1.
<Figure 3 about here>
Let us first consider the role of market size α. Figure 3 indicates that if
market size is small (in the dashed area), the equilibrium market structure
is separation. Intuitively, if the market is small, the benefits from integra-
tion are small relative to the given level of fixed cost F, as the increases in
demand and mark-up are necessarily limited. Put diﬀerently, the market is
not suﬃciently large to cover the fixed costs of integration. In contrast, if
market size is large (in the shaded area), the equilibrium structure is inte-
gration, as the increases in demand and mark-up from vertical integration
are suﬃciently large to cover the integration costs of both firms. For inter-
mediate market sizes, the integration costs of only one firm will be covered,
so that asymmetric integration occurs in equilibrium. These results reflect
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the fact that vertical integration decisions are strategic substitutes. That is,
the competitor’s integration reduces a firm’s own output and mark-up, which
makes integration less valuable.18
Next, consider the role of the investment cost parameter k. Recall that
if k is large, the cost of a given eﬃciency improvement is high. Figure 3
indicates that there is no one-to-one relationship between the level of k and
vertical market structure: A given level of k may be consistent with any
of the three equilibrium market structures. More importantly, the eﬀect
of k on the equilibrium structure of the industry depends on the relevant
market size α: For low values of α, increasing k leads to a change from
asymmetric integration to separation; whereas for high values of α, increasing
k will lead to a change from asymmetric integration to integration (rather
than separation).19 Thus, the impact of investment costs on vertical market
structure crucially depends on the size of the market under study.
Intuitively, the fact that k may have a positive or a negative impact on
integration stems from two countervailing eﬀects. On the one hand, as invest-
ment costs increase, the role of integration as a relatively cheap substitute
for cost-reducing investment becomes more important. Thus, the observa-
tion that increasing investment costs may lead from asymmetric integration
to full integration for suﬃciently high values of α is plausible. On the other
hand, with higher investment costs the intimidation eﬀect becomes less im-
portant and eventually vanishes altogether. Thus, it becomes less attractive
to deviate from a separation equilibrium, so that increasing investment costs
may result in a move from asymmetric integration to separation.
6 Discussion and Extensions
In this section, we elaborate on the interplay of endogenous investment and
integration decisions. Also, we sketch how our analysis can be generalized
beyond the linear Cournot model.
18See Buehler and Schmutzler (2005) for a more extensive discussion of this strategic-
substitutes property.
19For intermediate values of α, the equilibrium involves asymmetric integration inde-
pendent of k.
18
6.1 On the Role of Endogenous Investment for Equi-
librium Market Structure
As we have noted above, cost-reducing investment plays a crucial role for
explaining strategic behavior in successive oligopoly. To further explore how
accounting for endogenous cost-reducing investment aﬀects equilibrium mar-
ket structure, we now compare the equilibrium outcomes of the game de-
scribed above with the outcomes of a restricted version where firms cannot
invest by assumption:
Proposition 4 With endogenous investment, the parameter region for which
separation occurs is smaller than without investment.
The result can be seen from Figure 3, where the upper bound of the sep-
aration regime is upward sloping and the no-investment case corresponds to
k →∞. Proposition 4 relates to the intimidation eﬀect of integration iden-
tified above: With endogenous investment, unilateral deviation from sepa-
ration is more attractive than without investment, because integration has
the additional benefit of intimidating the competitor (i.e., tapering its cost-
reducing investment). Thus, in addition to the eﬃciency eﬀect that the
double mark-up is eliminated, another positive eﬀect of integration must be
taken into account, which tends to decrease the parameter region for which
full separation can be an equilibrium.
There is no analogous result for the boundary between asymmetric inte-
gration and integration. In (A2) in Appendix 3, we provide a closed-form
solution for this boundary, which is a non-monotonic function of k. That is,
the eﬀects of endogenizing investment costs depend on the level of investment
costs. The intuition for this non-monotonicity for given values of α is similar
to the intuition that k may lead to more integration for some values of α
and to less integration for others; it reflects the countervailing eﬀects that
higher investment costs increase the importance of integration as a substitute
for investment but also reduce the importance of the intimidation eﬀect (see
Section 5).
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6.2 On the Role of Endogenous Vertical Market Struc-
ture for Equilibrium Investment
For a fixed vertical market structure, the impact of the parameters (α, k) on
cost-reducing investment is straightforward. Diﬀerentiating the equilibrium
investment levels Y vi (α, k) in Table 1 with respect to k and α yields
∂Y vi (α, k)
∂k
< 0,
∂Y vi (α, k)
∂α
> 0.
That is, equilibrium investment levels decrease when investment costs in-
crease and increase when market size (and thus per-firm output) increases.
With endogenous vertical market structure, the impact of (α, k) on in-
vestment is no longer obvious, as both α and k potentially influence verti-
cal structure which, in turn, aﬀects investment decisions. With respect to
changes in α, the endogeneity of vertical market structure does not change
much. As explained above, the equilibrium structure first changes from sep-
aration to asymmetric integration and then to integration when α increases.
It can be shown that total investment typically increases with each integra-
tion decision.20 Thus, the indirect eﬀects of increasing α reinforce the direct
eﬀects.
With respect to changes in k, the indirect eﬀects are more interesting, as
the following result shows.
Proposition 5 Consider a critical combination of market size and invest-
ment costs, (α∗, k∗), where an increase in k leads to a regime change from
asymmetric integration to integration. Then an increase in k in the vicinity
of k∗ will increase (rather than decrease) the subgame-perfect level of total
investment provided that k∗ is above some critical value k.
Proof. Consider investments costs (k1, k2) close to k∗ such that k1 < k∗ <
k2. Using Table 1, total investment under asymmetric integration is given by
Y ASi (α∗, k1)+Y AIj (α∗, k1), whereas total investment under integration is given
20More specifically, using Table 1, straightforward calculations show that Y Si + Y
S
j <
Y AIi + Y
AS
j < Y
I
i + Y
I
j for k >
10
21 .
20
by 2Y Ii (α∗, k2). Therefore, as k1 and k2 approach k∗, the diﬀerence between
total investment under (α∗, k2) and (α∗, k1) approaches
α∗
µ
4
9k∗ − 2 −
−28 + 129k∗
432 (k∗)2 − 195k∗ + 14
¶
,
which is positive for k∗ > k = 10
21
.
Thus, near the regime boundary, increasing marginal investment costs
induces higher (rather than lower) total investments. A similar argument
holds for the change from separation to asymmetric integration.
While we do not want to overstate the generality of this point, it illus-
trates nicely that treating integration and cost-reducing investment as jointly
endogenous variables leads to insights that are obscured by treating each
variable separately.
6.3 Beyond the Linear Cournot Case
In the working paper version of this article (Buehler and Schmutzler 2004),
we analyze similar issues in a more general reduced-form setting. With a
small set of additional technical conditions, our key argument can briefly be
summarized as follows.
Consider an arbitrary successive oligopoly model with the following key
features:
(i) Equilibrium outputs and mark-up are higher for more eﬃcient firms;
(ii) Equilibrium outputs and mark-ups are increased by own integration
and decreased by competitor integration.
For models with these features, the conclusions of Lemma 2 can be shown
to hold. Specifically, the results of this paper for investment incentives con-
tinue to hold: Marginal investment incentives are (i) higher for more eﬃ-
cient firms, (ii) increased by own integration, and (iii) reduced by competitor
integration. Perhaps more importantly, the intimidation eﬀect of vertical
integration on investments still holds, and asymmetric vertical integration
continues to be a non-degenerate equilibrium outcome.
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7 Conclusions
We have argued that the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and
investment decisions is crucial for our understanding of strategic behavior in
successive oligopoly. Specifically, our main findings are the following:
First, a firm’s vertical integration increases its own investment and de-
creases the competitor’s investment. We call the adverse eﬀect on the com-
petitor’s investment the intimidation eﬀect of vertical integration. The in-
timidation eﬀect implies that there is a strategic integration incentive that
has gone unnoticed in the previous literature. In particular, vertical inte-
gration may serve as a top dog strategy, tapering the competitor’s cost-
reducing investment. Second, asymmetric integration is a non-degenerate
equilibrium outcome even if firms are symmetric initially. This result re-
flects the strategic-substitutes property of vertical-integration decisions and
is consistent with the symmetric vertical market structures documented in
the literature for various industries. Third, compared to a benchmark model
without endogenous investment, vertical separation is a less likely outcome.
This result again relates to the intimidation eﬀect of vertical integration:
With endogenous investment, unilateral deviation from separation is more
attractive than without investment, because vertical integration has the ad-
ditional benefit of intimidating the competitor. We highlight that our results
generalize beyond the Cournot model, provided that integration has a posi-
tive eﬀect on own output and mark-up and a negative eﬀect on competitor
output and mark-up.
Among the potential limitations of the paper, the assumption of fixed in-
tegration costs deserves to be mentioned. One could imagine a richer setting
where integration costs depend, for instance, on market structure, reflect-
ing the opportunity costs of the acquisition target. Such a generalization
would clearly have some appeal: Even though some aspects of acquisitions
costs (including, e.g., administrative eﬀorts), are presumably independent
of vertical structure, the latter might influence acquisition costs through its
influence on the value of the acquiree. With endogenous acquisition costs,
the strategic-substitutes property of integration decisions might be aﬀected
(if acquisition costs decrease when a competitor becomes integrated). How-
22
ever, modeling such ideas would require a specific model of acquisition costs,
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Appendix 1: Product Market Equilibrium
<Table 1 here>
Appendix 2: Alternative Solution Concept
In this appendix, we use the alternative solution concept proposed by Schrader
and Martin (1998) to solve the linear Cournot model. That is, we impose that
integrated firms conjecture Cournot reactions to both input sales and purchases.
In this setting, we have to account for the potential upstream sales and purchases
of an integrated firm. To do this, we add a term (w − ci) ri to the profit function
of an integrated firm i, where w denotes the input price and ri is the output that
an integrated firm sells (ri > 0) or buys (ri < 0) in the input market. That is, an
integrated firm i chooses downstream output qi and upstream output ri so as to
max
qi,ri
(a− qi − qj − ci) qi + (w − ci) ri,
Maximizing over qi yields the Cournot outputs, mark-ups and profits given in
(1) and (2). That is, in stage 4 of the game both solution concepts yield the same
result. This is no longer true for stage 3. To show this, we consider each market
configuration in turn. Throughout we impose a market-clearing assumption which
requires that aggregate output equals aggregate input.
(i) Under integration, market clearing requires q1+r1+q2+r2 = q1+q2, which,
using symmetry, immediately implies r1 = r2 = 0. That is, the product
market equilibrium is the same for both solution concepts.
(ii) Under asymmetric integration, suppose firm 1 is integrated. Market clearing
requires r1+r2 = q2. Using q2(c1, c2) from stage 4, we can invert the market-
clearing condition to calculate the derived upstream demand
w(r1, r2) =
1
2
α− 1
2
Y1 + Y2 −
3
2
(r1 + r2).
Maximizing the profit of the integrated firm over r1 and the profit of the
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separated upstream firm over r2 yields
r1(Y1, Y2) = −
1
12
α− 5
12
Y1 +
1
3
Y2 < 0,
r2(Y1, Y2) =
5
24
α+
1
24
Y1 +
1
6
Y2 > 0,
i.e., the integrated firm will buy from the input market, even though doing
so involves higher costs than producing the input internally (w(Y1, Y2) > 0).
Put diﬀerently, the integrated firm accepts incrementally higher inputs costs,
because buying from the upstream market raises the separated downstream
rival’s costs. Substituting back into the relevant functions yields the follow-
ing equilibrium quantities:
w(Y1, Y2) =
5α+ Y1 + 4Y2
16
;
QAI1 (Y1, Y2) =
7α+ 11Y1 − 4Y2
16
, QAS2 (Y1, Y2) =
2α− 6Y1 + 8Y2
16
;
ΠAI1 (Y1, Y2) =
(7α+ 11Y1 − 4Y2)2
256
− (5α+ Y1 + 4Y2) (α+ 5Y1 − 4Y2)
192
;
ΠAS2 (Y1, Y2) =
(α+ 4Y2 − 3Y1)2
64
.
(iii) Under separation, both solution concepts yield the same result, as the diﬀer-
ence in the assumptions on the integrated firms’ conjectures are irrelevant.
The only diﬀerence to the model presented in the text thus concerns the case
of asymmetric integration. Straightforward calculations show that the conditions
in Lemma 2 still hold when ΠAIi and Π
AS
i are replaced by the expressions for the
case with upstream sales. Thus, the main mechanisms of the paper, in particular
the intimidation eﬀect, are still present if one allows for upstream sales.
Appendix 3: Conditions of Proposition 4
In this appendix, we provide the conditions (i)-(iii) of Proposition 3 for the linear
Cournot model in explicit form.
(i) Vertical separation occurs in equilibrium iﬀ eΠAIi − eΠSi ≤ F . Substituting
25
from Table 1, we haveµ
(5α+ 7Yi − 2Yj)2
144
− kYi2
¶
−
µ
(4α+ 11Yi − 7Yj)2
324
− kYi2
¶
≤ F.
Using the relevant investment levels (Y1, Y2) from Table 1, rearranging yields
α2k
Ã
(144k − 49) (15k − 2)2
(432k2 − 195k + 14)2
− (324k − 121)
(81k − 11)2
!
≤ F. (A1)
(ii) Vertical integration occurs in equilibrium iﬀ eΠI1 − eΠASi ≥ F . Substituting
from Table 1, we haveÃ
(4α+ 8Yi − 4Yj)2
144
− kY 21
!
−
Ã
(2α− 2Yj + 4Yi)2
144
− kY 21
!
≥ F.
Using the relevant investment levels for each market configuration from Ta-
ble 1, rearranging yields
α2k
Ã
(9k − 4)
(9k − 2)2
− 4 (9k − 1) (12k − 7)
2
(432k2 − 195k + 14)2
!
≥ F. (A2)
(iii) Asymmetric integration occurs in equilibrium iﬀ (eΠAIi − eΠSi ≥ F ≥ eΠIi −eΠASi ). Using (A1) and (A2), we immediately have
α2k
Ã
(144k − 49) (15k − 2)2
(432k2 − 195k + 14)2
− (324k − 121)
(81k − 11)2
!
≥ F
≥ α2k
Ã
(9k − 4)
(9k − 2)2
− 4 (9k − 1) (12k − 7)
2
(432k2 − 195k + 14)2
!
.
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Figure 1: Timing of the game
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Figure 2: Investments (Panel a)) and market shares (Panel b)) under asym-
metric integration (α = 1).
31
0
1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
5
separation
integration
asymmetric integration
k

Figure 3: Equilibrium vertical structure in the linear Cournot model (F = 1)
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Table 1: Product market equilibrium of the linear Cournot model
Separation Asymmetric Integration Integration
Input prices wvi (Yi, Yj)
wSi =
2α+Yi+Yj
6
wAIi = 0, wASi =
α−Yi+2Yj
4
wIi = 0
Outputs and Mark-ups Qvi (Yi, Yj) =Mvi (Yi, Yj)
QSi =
4α−7Yj+11Yi
12
QAIi =
5α+7Yi−2Yj
12
, QASi =
2α−2Yj+4Yi
12
QIi =
α+2Yi−Yj
3
Profits Πvi (Yi, Yj)
ΠSi =
(4α−7Yj+11Yi)2
324
ΠAIi =
(5α+7Yi−2Yj)2
144
,ΠASi =
(2α−2Yj+4Yi)2
144
ΠIi =
(α+2Yi−Yj)2
9
Investments Y vi , Y vj
Y Si =
11α
81k−11 Y
AI
i =
−14α+105αk
432k2−195k+14 , Y
AS
i =
−14α+24αk
432k2−195k+14 Y
I
i =
2α
9k−2
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